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Internal and External Financing
IN this part of the report, financial trends in manufacturing and in
mining over the past half-century are reviewed. Attention is focused
primarily on two aspects of the financial growth of these industries. In
this chapter, long-run tendencies in internal and external financing are
examined and compared. In the following chapter, the various debt
and equity components of external financing are analyzed, and the
trends in total debt and total equity (both from internal and external
sources) are compared. At the outset, however, the basic concepts
should be discussed and some technical terms defined.
Concepts and Definitions
It has become customary to refer to funds obtained through income
retention as "internal financing." The amounts so designated will
differ depending on the degree of netness or grossness desired. Here,
"net income retention" (or net internal financing) will designate the
undistributed net profit remaining in the business after dividend pay-
ments. "Gross income retention" (or gross internal financing) will
denote the amount of undistributed net profit plus depreciation and
depletion allowances.' "External financing," will refer to funds ob-
tained through new capital stock issues (external equity financing) and
through various types of loans, e.g., bond issues, mortgages, bank loans,
trade credit, etc.'
The sum of internal and external funds from all sources represents
the total new financing available for investment in business assets—
both physical(land,buildings, equipment, and inventories) and
financial (claims in the form of cash, government and corporate
IFundsobtained internally are sometimes called "corporate saving.' Here again,
one must distinguish between the net and gross amounts of corporate saving, de-
pending on whether depreciation and depletion are excluded or included with the
amount of net income retained.
2Currentliabilities of corporations reporting net income include accrued income
taxes. Since tax accruals represent a form of debt financing (the companies in
question temporarily retain the money owed to the government), they are usually
included in external financing (see, for example, Economic Report of the President,
January 1956, Table D-55, p. 227). We shall, generally, adhere to this classification.
However, since accrued taxes represent a part of the income stream, it is sometimes
appropriate to include them in retained gross income. To avoid possible misunder-
standing, specific indication will be given in the text when this, or any other,
reclassification is made.
109LOJVG-TERM TREJ'IDS IX CAPITAL FIXANCING
securities, and loans and advances to other firms and individuals).
Although, in a closed economic system considered as a whole, financial
claims and liabilities will necessarily cancel out, clearly, this is not true
of an individual firm or industry. Therefore, to analyze changes in the
invested capital of a firm (industry), changes in financial claims on
other sectors of the economy must be studied along with changes in
physical assets.
However, investment in different types of assets does not have the same
effect on the balance of claims between the investing firm (industry)
and the rest of the economy. Assume, for example, that a corpora-
tion obtains new funds, from various sources, totaling $100 million,
and that $60 millionisspent on physical-plant expansion, and
the remaining $40 million is used to expand financial assets (accounts
receivable, and loans to and investments in other firms). The liabilities
of the company to its investors (including both the creditors and the
stockholders) will then rise by $100 million, but the change will be
partially offset by the $40 million increase in the claims of the company
on other economic units. The net balance of claims between the firm
and the rest of the economy will change by $60 million. However, if
the expenditures on physical plant were $80 million and those on
financial assets only $20 million, the change in total assets and total
liabilities would still be $100 million; but the change in the net balance
$80 million instead of $60 million.
Changes in the net balance of claims between a given sector and the
rest of the economy have sometimes been called by economists "net
inflow" or "net absorption" of capital funds by the sector in question.3
Such a "net inflow" does not represent an accumulation of cash within
the sector, because outpayments are involved in acquiring both physical
and financial assets. But when physical assets are expanded, outpay-
ments represent payments to factors used to produce new plant,
equipment, inventories, etc.' In other words, to the recipients, such
outpayments represent income, rather than capital funds. On the other
hand, when financial assets are expanded, capital funds are transferred
to other sectors as capital funds, not as payments for current productive
services.
Net inflow of capital funds represents, then, the amount of new
See,forexample, George Terborgh, The Bogeyof Economic Maturity,
Machinery and Allied Products Institute, 1945, p. 141.
'Of course, if the physical-asset expansion does not involve new production but
is merely a transfer of assets previously held by another sector, then the expendi-
tures do not represent payments for current productive services. However, the ex-
pansion of physical assets owned by the cntire manufacturing and mining sector
over the period reviewed has been due mainly to new production, rather than to
transfers from other scctors.
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financing used for real capital formation within the sector. It is net of
funds transferred to other sectors and used by them for real capital
formation.
In addition to the net balance of all financial transactions for a
given sector, one may wish to compute the net balance of claims and
liabilities arising from a particular type of transaction. Thus, the
amount of new security issues sold by the sector, less the amount of
securities purchased by it, will represent the net balance of security
transactions;the change in accounts payable, less the change in
accounts receivable, the net balance of trade credits; and the change
in bank loans, less the change in cash balances held in the banks, the
net balance of bank financing.
Or, one may wish to analyze changes in the net balance of claims
between the sector and the government by comparing the change in
tax accruals with the change in government securities held by the
sector. And changes in the net balance of claims between the firms
concerned and their stockholders over a given period will be indicated
by the amount of new stock issues plus the amount of retained profits,
less the change, if any, in loans or advances by the firms to their
stockholders.
The sum of changes in all the liabilities, representing various forms
of external financing, adjusted for the sum of changes in the various
claims represented by financial assets, can be called the net balance of
external financing. This measure is useful because it indicates the total
amount of funds obtained, on balance, from the money and capital
markets. It has been developed and used by Terborgh in his analysis
of financial trends in the United States.5
All major types of financial assets (cash, receivables, and government
and corporate securities) represent logical counterparts of one or
another type of external financing. Does this mean that our concept of
net balance is applicable only to external financing? Actually, net in-
ternal financing, as defined above, already represents the net balance
between the revenue and expenditure flows. But the expenditures in-
volved do not usually result in any accumulation of financial assets
that should be taken as an offset to the accumulation of earned surplus.
In some statements of sources and uses of funds, the entire net profit is
shown as a source of funds and dividends paid, as a use of funds. In
such a statement, net internal financing is equal to the difference be-
tween a fund inflow (profit) and a fund outflow (dividends). However,
this outflow represents an income payment, not a transfer of capital
funds, and does not result in an expansion of any financial asset on the
Jbid., pp.139—148.
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balance sheet of the firm—.--the change in the earned surplus of the firm
already represents the net balance between the two flows.
Admittedly, the type of analysis of capital fund flows outlined above
has certain limitations. The available corporate financial statements
do not, as a rule, show the exact items for which the funds obtained
from a given source were spent. If a corporation raised $50 million
in a given year through a new stock flotation and spent $30 million
during the same year in expanding its holdings of the securities
of other companies, we may conclude that the company, has, on
balance, drawn $20 million from the security market. But the funds
used to purchase securities do not necessarily represent part of the
funds received through the stock flotation unless the latter was the
only source of new financing during that year. If the firm retained
$40 million from operations during the same year, the funds obtained
from the stock sale may have been used to expand plant and equip-
inent and the internal funds, to purchase securities.
Even more caution is required, of course, in drawing conclusions
from aggregate data for groups of corporations (e.g., the entire manu-
facturing industry). If all companies combined show a negligible net
balance of security financing in a given year, clearly, it does not mean
that this type of financing was unimportant for each and every indi-
vidual firm. Some may have relied heavily on the security market as a
source of new funds while others may have been returning funds to
the market through security purchases and retirements.
Internal funds of some corporations may be invested in new security
issues of other companies, and the money may be used by the latter to
expand their physical assets. The consolidated balance sheet for both
groups of companies will show no external financing. Yet, the firms
which expanded their physical assets clearly could not have done so if
they had not received external financial help from the other companies.
A study of such intercompany financial flows within an industry would
be of considerable importance; unfortunately, our data are inadequate
for this purpose.
Sources of Data
Our analysis of financial trends in manufacturing and in mining is
confined to corporations, since almost no data are available for non-
corporate establishments. However, in recent years, corporations have
accounted for over 90 per cent of the total value of output. Even at the
beginning of the century, when the relative share of corporations was
somewhat smaller, it exceeded two-thirds of the total. Thus, in dis-
cussing the financing of corporations, we shall be dealing with a major
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portion of the two industries in the early years and with practically
the entire industry in the latter part of the period reviewed.
Even for corporations, our data on sources and uses of funds are far
from complete. Annual series on corporate retained profits, deprecia-
tion and depletion allowances, and security issues are available for the
entire 1900—1953 period.6 We also have annual series on plant and
equipment expenditures since 1900. But statistical information on
external financing obtained from sources other than security issues is
rather limited. Some sample data have been assembled for large manu-
facturing corporations, from which statements of sources and uses of
funds have been prepared. These sample materials cover the entire
period, although the samples are of different size and the data prior to
1914 are not sufficiently detailed to permit a complete flow-of-funds
analysis.
The Department of Commerce has prepared statements of sources
and uses of funds for all manufacturing corporations, but only for
post-World War II, 1946—1953. However, the balance sheet and in-
come data published in the Statistics of Income permit one to make
rough estimates of the various types of financing used by all manu-
facturing and mining corporations over a considerably longer period,
1926—1953.
A rough indication of the relative importance of internal and ex-
ternal financing over the past half-century may be obtained by com-
paring corporate retained profits with corporate asset expansion. This
is done in the next section. Later, we examine the various components
of corporate financing in more detail, using such data as are available
for different subperiods.
Asset Growth and Profit Retentions
During the first half of this century, the manufacturing and mining
industries taken together were one of the fastest growing sectors of our
economy. The combined output (in current prices) of manufacturing
and mining rose from $11.7 billion in 1900 to $224 billion in 1948.
Around 1900, slightly more than one-fifth of national income originated
in these industries; in the twenties, their share rose to roughly one-
quarter of the total; in recent years, it has been nearly one-third.
The growth in output obviously required a rapid expansion of
capital facilities. As Table 38 indicates, the book value of corporate
assets in manufacturing and mining rose from $6.8 billion in 1900 to
6 These series are based on the data compiled by Raymond Goldsmith and W.
Braddock Hickman. See Appendix C, section A for a more detailed description of


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FINANCING
$155.5 billion in 1953. The rate of change varied widely from decade
to decade. A declining tendency can be observed over 1900—1937
(except during the World War I years, 1914—1919), but a reversal is
evident during 1937—1953. The expansion rate for 1948—1953 was
1.7 times as high as that for 1919—1929, although still below the rate
for 1900—1909.
Since the asset values given in Table 38 do not include investments
in securities and no adjustments were made for revaluations, the net
asset changes shown in column 2 do not measure accurately the total
funds (internal plus external) used for expansion. Yet, by comparing
the changes with net profits retained over corresponding periods, one
can obtain a rough indication of the relative importance of net internal
financing. Substantial profit retentions were made in every period
except 1929—1937. The ratio of retained profit to asset change showed
a rising tendency over 1900—1919. In 1919—1929, however, the ratio was
relatively low,8 while in 1929—1937 income retention gave place to net
dissaving. The ratio reached a new high in 1937—1948, but declined
once more in 1948—1953. Although the postwar figure is much higher
than that for the twenties, it does not appear high when compared with
the earlier ratios.
In general, then, the data presented in Table 38 reveal no definite
trend in the relative importance of retained profit over the entire
period, although, owing to their obvious limitations, they do not prove
conclusively that there was no long.term trend. If more observations
over a longer period were available, a significant trend might appear,
although it could hardly be more than a mild one. But imperfect as
they are, the figures can show the historical processes in broad outline.
They indicate the existence of long swings, lasting more than one
7Thedata in Table 38 represent the book value of total assets excluding invest-
ments in government and corporate securities. The figures on total assets including
investments in securities are available in Statistics of Income only since 1926. They
are presented below for several selected years. Net profit data shown below are from
Appendix Table C-l, column S. Dollar amounts are in millions; the ratio was not
computed for 1937 because both numerator and denominator were negative.
Assets Retained Net Profit
Rate of Ratio to
Change fromChange per year Total since Asset Change
Total Prior rear (per cent) Prior rear (per cent)
1926$ 68,272
1929 72,903 $+4,631 +2.2% $2,012 43.4%
1937 64,869 —8,034 —1.4 —10,646 —
1948 130,750 +65,881 +6.6 30,809 46.7
1953 188,966 +58,216 +7.6 22,191 38.1
8Thelow figure obtained for 1919—1929 is mainly the result of low profit reten-
tions in the early part of the decade. For 1926—1929, the ratio of retained profit to
asset change was 40 per cent—moderately below the figure for 1948—195S.
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decade, in both the asset expansion rate and the ratio of retained profit
to asset expansion. A downswing (or an upswing) that continues for
two or three decades may look like a secular trend, and one may be
tempted to take it as a basis for long-run projections. However, it may
be just one phase of a long wave.
Table 38 also includes figures on new security issues. In general,
security sales were much less important as a source of new financing
than was net profit retention, especially during 1914—1919 and 1937—
1948. The ratio of security issues to asset change have varied inversely
with the ratio of retained profits to asset change: the security ratio was
relatively low in 1914—1919 and 1937—1948 when the profit ratio was
relatively high, and the security ratio rose in 1919—1929, while the
profit ratio declined. However, although the security ratio for 1948—
1953 is much lower than it was for 1900—1909 and 1909—1914, the profit
ratio shows no counterbalancing upward shift in the postwar period.
Other sources of funds must have gained in relative impo'rtance, and
corporate income tax reserves are clearly a case in point. Income tax
reserves are conventionally considered to be a part of short-term ex-
ternal financing. However, since they represent a portion of sales
revenue earmarked for a specific purpose, they may also be considered
as a kind of short-term income retention. Thus, changes in the relative
importance of the combined long-term and short-term income reten-
tions (i.e., retained profits plus additions to income tax reserves) may
be relevant. The ratios to net asset changes of the sum of retained net
profits plus net additions to tax reserves are as follows:
Ratio of Retained Net Profit










a Retained net profits are from Appendix Table C-2, column I; tax accruals are based
on data in Statistics of Income; assets are from Appendix Table C-l, columnS. Since income
tax reserves are not given as a separate item in the corporate balance sheets published in
Statistics of income, they had to be estimated on the basis of tax liability for different years.
Considering how large corporate tax liability has been in recent years, the change in the
ratios resulting from the inclusion of this item may appear to be surprisingly small.
However, while the total annual amount of tax liability has often been much larger than
the annual amount of retained profit, the increase in tax reserves from one year to the
following has generally been much smaller than the increase in earned surplus.
Federal income tax, at the modest rate of 1 per cent of net income,
was first imposed on corporations in 1909. The first substantial rise in
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the tax liability—and, consequently, in the reserves made to meet it—
occurred during World War I. In the interwar period, the tax liability
declined, but it rose again during World War II. After a brief reversal
in the immediate postwar period, the upward trend was resumed as a
result of the outbreak of the Korean hostilities in 1951. Accordingly, add-
ing net changes in the income tax reserves to the total amount retained
considerably increases the ratio of retentions to asset changes in 1914—
1919, 1937—1948, and 1948—1953. As a result, the total retention ratio
shows something of an upward trend over the entire 1900—1953 period.
Accumulation of tax reserves has not been the only expanding source
TABLE 39
Growth of Corporate Assets and the Relative Importance of External and Net
Internal Financing, Large Manufacturing Corporations, 1900—1954
(per cent)
Period





Assets As Percentage of Total New Financing
1900—1910 +2.6 n.a. 43.1 56.9
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCL.ESb
1914—1919 + 12.8 +9.1 48.0 52.0
1919—1921 +1.4 +3.1 1.8 98.2
1921—1924 +4.9 +6.0 37.0 63.0
1924—1927 +4.3 +3.4 15.6 84.4
1927—1932 +1.1 +1.3
C C
1932—1938 +0.6 + 1.0 62.6 37.4
1938—1946 +5.4 +2.7 40.8 59.2
1946—1949 + 10.8 + 15.1 43.0 57.0
1949_1954d +9.8 + 10.3 49.4 50.6
INVERTED BUSINESS
1913—1918 + 14.1 +9.2 49.7 50.3
1918—1920 +6.3 +7.1 28.3 71.7
1920—1923 —1.8 +0.3
C C
1923—1926 +4.4 +3.6 23.9 76.1




1937_1944e +8.5 +3.4 57.4 42.6
1944—1948 +4.5 +9.2 21.4 78.6
1948_1954d +9.9 + 10.2 46.9 53.1
n.a. =notavailable.
a Plant and equipment plus inventories.
I Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.
C Ratios are not computed when numerator, denominator, or both, are negative.
dUnderlyingdata cover 1949—1953.
Underlying data cover 1938—1944.
Source: 1900—1938: National Bureau of Economic Research samples; 1938-1953:
Federal Reserve Board sample of large manufacturing corporations.
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of funds available to corporations. Another characteristic of the post-
World War II period has been the substantial expansion of short-term
notes and accounts payable to commercial banks and other creditors.
Also, a new type of medium- and long-term credit (the "term" loan)
has been developed. (These new developments are discussed in some
detail in Chapter VII.)
The data for all manufacturing and mining corporations combined,
presented in Table 38, are supplemented in Table 39 by the available
sample data for large manufacturing companies. The sample materials
include balance sheets and statements of sources and uses of funds,
from which the rate of expansion of both total assets (including in-
vestment in securities) and physical assets (plant and equipment plus
inventories) could be computed and the relative importance of total
external, as well as internal financing measured. Annual data are
available from 1914 on, although the sample does not remain identical
over the entire period. Since we are interested in the long-run tend-
encies, rather than in short-run cyclical fluctuations, the figures in
Table 39 are presented in the form of averages for both the positive
(trough-to-trough) and inverted (peak-to-peak) business cycles.
Broadly speaking, the ratios for large corporations reveal a picture
similar to that portrayed by the figures for all corporations. Tables 38
and 39 indicate that both external and internal funds were important
in financing asset expansion during most of the period reviewed. The
ratio of retained net profit to total new financing (Table 39) fluctuates
widely from one business cycle to another, but here again, no clear and
persistent trend may be discerned.
However, some important differences between the two sets of data
do appear. The figures for large corporations show the clear pre-
dominance of internal funds during the twenties. In the 1923—1926 and
the 1926—1929 peak-to-peak cycles, and also in the 1924—1927 trough-
to-trough cycle, the ratio of retained net profit to total new financing
rose sharply, while external financing became relatively insignificant.
In contrast, the data on all corporations indicate a relatively heavy
dependence on external financing during the twenties. In the postwar
period, however, large corporations again used external funds on a
substantial scale, and their ratios were not essentially different from
those for all corporations.9
The ratios for large companies indicate that the relative importance
of external funds varied with the rate of asset expansion. When assets
9Sincethe data for large corporations were not derived by the same method and
are not, therefore,strictly comparable with the data for all corporations, one
should• be cautious in attaching significance to relatively minor differences between
the ratios in Tables 38 and 39.
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expanded at moderate rates, internal funds were generally sufficient to
cover most capital requirements; external financing was little needed,
even though retained profits were not especially high. When assets
expanded more rapidly, profits were generally higher; but the rise in
profits was less pronounced than the rise in capital requirements and,
therefore, the need for external financing increased.
As Table 39 indicates, the rates of total asset growth and physical
asset growth of large manufacturing corporations were much higher in
the postwar cycles (1946—1949 and 1949—1954) than they had been
during any of the interwar cycles. The ratio of external financing to
total new financing was also higher after the war. The World War I
cycle (1914—1919) was characterized by a more pronounced asset ex-
pansion than the World War II cycle (1938—1946). Accordingly, the
ratio of external to total financing was higher during the first war.
Obviously, the relative importance of external financing was de-
termined by a number of factors. The ratio of external to total
financing was considerably lower in 1926—1929 than in the other cycles
with comparable asset expansion rates because of the relatively high
profitability and high retention ratios of the late twenties compared
with the other parts of the interwar period. Also, the ratio of external
to total financing was relatively high in 1932—1938, even though the
asset expansion rate was very iow during that cycle. However, the
dollar value of external financing was quite small in 1932—1938, and
its ratio to the total was high only because the amount of net internal
financing was exceedingly small. Thus, the significance of the ratio is
greatly reduced. In addition, corporate finance in 1936 and 1937 was
affected by the undistributed profits tax, which markedly reduced the
proportion of net profit retained.
The data on all corporations (Table 38) do not indicate any clear
relation between the ratio of external funds to total financing and the
rate of asset growth, partly, perhaps, because of imperfect data. The
ratios for all companies could be computed oniy for relatively long
periods. Thus, the effect of the expansion rate may have been obscured
by the interference of other factors. However, it is probably also true
that, large firms, which have generally had an easier access to the
capital market, could increase the use of external funds more rapidly,
when fast asset expansion was warranted by business conditions, than
could smaller firms.1°
10InDobrovolsky'searlierstudy,Corporate Income Retention,1915—1943,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, the following regression equations
were obtained for 1921—1941:
Large companies: R =+1.71 + .50G —.12t
Small companies: R= —1.01 -F-.65G.l-.02t
where R is the annual rate of retained profit, G is the annual rate of total asset
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Gross Internal Financing and Security Issues
As already mentioned, annual series on internal financing and
security issues are available beginning 1900 (see Appendix Tables C-i
and C2). But, since both series are characterize4 by strong cyclical
fluctuations, the data are presented as cycle averages in Table 40. The
average annual values are given for both trough-to-trough (positive)
and peak-to-peak (inverted) business cycles.
The average amount of gross internal financing increased fifteen
times in the half-century between the 1900—1904 and the 1949—1954
cycles.1' The average amount of new plant and equipment expenditures
showed a thirteenfold rise over the same period. In contrast, the average
amount of new security issues showed only a fivefold rise." However,
although the three series differ widely from one another in the extent
of growth, they show similar major swings. As Chart 10 and Table 40
indicate, cycle averages rose only moderately in 1900—1911. Pronounced
upswings occurred during and after World War I. The averages re-
mained high in the twenties, but substantial downswings took place in
the thirties. Finally, all three series display exceedingly high upswings
in the forties—both during and after World War II.
A closer look at the data reveals that major movements in the
securities series tended to lag behind those in the gross internal
financing series. Thus, while the gross internal financing cycle average
rose sharply in the 1914—1919 trough-to-trough (or 1913—1918 peak-to-
peak) cycle, the securities average advanced only moderately in the war
cycle but much more sharply in the following cycle (1919—1921 or
1918—1920). Again, while the gross internal financing average showed
a pronounced rise in the 1938—1946 (1937—1944) cycle and a further
pronounced increase in the 1946—1949 (1944—1948) cycle, the securities
series displayed a relatively small advance in the former, but a much
larger one in the latter cycle.
Specific conditions created by the two major wars account for these
lags. Each time, the wartime expansion in output was accompanied by
a rise both in corporate profits (even after taxes) and in depreciation
and depletion allowances. On the other hand, the market for corporate
expansion and trepresentstime (both R and C are expressed as percentages of
total assets at the beginning of the year).
The equation for large companies indicates that while R varied directly with G,
the ratio of R to C decreased as G increased. The data for small companies, on the
other hand, show a direct relationship not only between R and G, but also
between RIG and G.
11Averagesfor the 1949—1954 positive cycle cover 1949—1953.
2Theserates of change are obtained by comparing the first and the last trough-
to-trough cycles. Almost identical rates are obtained when the first and the last
peak-to-peak cycles (1899—1903 and 1948—1953) are compared with each other.
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TABLE 40
AllManufacturingand Mining Corporations: Gross Internal Financing, New
Security Issues, and Plant and Equipment Expenditures, 1900—1953
Gross Internal
Gross New Plant and Gross New Financing and
Internal Security Equipment Internal SecurityNew Security
Financing Issues Expenditures Financing Issues Issues
Average Annual Amounta in As Percentage of Plant and Equipment
Millions Expenditures
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLESt)
1900-1904$719 $412 $803 89.5%51.3% 140.8%
1904—1908 781 256 1,002 77.9 25.5 103.5
1908—1911 962 317 1,066 90.2 29.7 120.0
1911—1914 1,101 271 1,187 92.8 22.8 115.6
1914—19193,138 488 2,041 153.7 23.9 177.7
1919—1921 2,230 1,242 2,706 82.4 45.9 128.3
1921—1924 2,281 668 2,097 108.8 31.9 140.6
1924—19273,024 873 2,557 118.3 34.1 152.4
1927—1932 1,318 587 2,285 57.7 25.7 83.4
1932—1938 1,206 —75 1,763 68.4 nc. 64.2
1938—19464,765 206 3,171 150.3 6.5 156.8
1946—19499,770 1,935 8,382 116.6 23.1 139.6
1949_1954c11,078 2,128 10,308 107.5 20.6 128.1
INVERTED BUSINESS CYcLEIb
1899_1903d 705 416 791 89.1 52.6 141.7
1903—1907 756 256 951 79.5 26.9 106.4
1907—1910 893 288 774 115.4 37.2 152.6
1910—1913 1,074 328 875 122.7 37.5 160.2
1913—1918 2,659 365 1,722 154.4 21.1 175.6
1918—1920 3,435 1,060 2,861 120.1 37.0 157.1
1920—1923 1,695 848 2,169 78.1 39.1 117.2
1923—1926 3,012 753 2,400 125.5 31.4 156.9
1926—19292,995 1,008 2,813 106.5 35.8 142.3
1929—1937 754 10 1,736 43.4 0.6 44.0
1937—1944 4,051 107 2,695 150.3 4.0 154.3
1944—1948 7,637 1,346 6,434 118.7 20.9 139.7
1948—1953 10,869 2,101 9,703 112.0 21.7 133.7
SELECTEDPERIODS
1900—1914 865 307 993 87.1 30.9 118.0
1919—1929 2,755 939 2,555 107.8 36.8 144.6
1936—1940 2,243 156 2,433 92.2 6.4 98.6
1946—1953 10,300 2,054 9,370 109.9 21.9 131.8
n.c.=notcomputed because numerator is negative.
a In computing averages for business cycle periods, values for terminal years are weighted
by one-half for complete cycles. For incomplete cycles, only values at peak or trough
terminal years are weighted by one-half.
bBESed on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.
C Averages cover 1949—1953.
1Averages cover 1900—1903.
Source: Column 1, Appendix Table C-3; Column 2, Appendix Table C-i; Column 3,
Appendix Table C-S.
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securities remained relatively inactive during the war years but became
very buoyant after the end of hostilities.
CHART10
Internal Financing, New Security Issues, and Plant and Equipment
Expenditures, All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations, 1900—1953
Source: Table 40.
(averages during positive business cycles)
The securities series also lags the major downswings of the thirties.
The gross internal financing average shows a pronounced drop in the
1927—1932 trough-to-trough cycle, followed by a further moderate
decline in the 1932—1938 cycle. The securities average, on the other
hand, shows a relatively small contraction in 1927—1932 but a much
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sharper one in 1932—1938. The data on the peak-to-peak cycles reveal
this lag even more clearly. Gross internal financing has a mild con-
traction in 1926—1929 followed by a more pronounced drop in 1929—
1937. But, in the securities series, the upswing of the twenties includes
1926—1929, and the sharp reversal does not occur until 1929—1937.
Several factors accounted for the lag in the thirties. Corporate net
profits had already declined substantially in the early years of the de-
pression. Corporate retained profits declined even more sharply because
many companies maintained dividends in excess of current earnings.
On the other hand, the most pronounced decline in net security issues
(new issues less retirements) occurred in the later stages of the de-
pression, when large accumulations of inactive cash allowed substantial
bond retirements (again, see Appendix Tables C-i and C-2).
Generally similar trends and major swings are evident in the ratios
of new security issues to gross internal financing for all manufacturing
and mining and for the samples of large manufacturing concerns
(Chart 11). However, there are some significant differences. Thus, in
CHART II
Ratios of New Security Issues to Gross Internal Financing, All








Source: Tables 40 and 44.
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the twenties, when the security market was, in general, very active,
security issues (net of retirement) of large manufacturing corporations
were surprisingly low in relation to their internal financing (12 and
6 per cent for 1923—1926 and 1926—1929, respectively; the correspond-
ing figures for all manufacturing and mining were 25 and 33 per cent;
see Table 40). Apparently, the high profitability of large corporations
during that period allowed them to meet most of their capital outlay
requirements with funds obtained inteinally. Indeed, some large com-
panies, notably the U.S. Steel Corporation, were able, in the late
twenties, to retire large amounts of previously issued securities.13
The ratio of security issues to gross internal financing for all manu-
facturing and mining corporations dropped sharply from 1926—1929 to
1929—1937 (from 1927—1932 to 1932—1938, trough-to-trough) but the
corresponding ratio for large corporations showed little change. In the
World War II cycle (1938—1946 or 1937—1944) security issues were
relatively unimportant both for the large corporations and for all
corporations combined. In the first postwar cycle (1946—1949), the ratio
of security issues to gross internal financing rose to 24 per cent for large
companies and to 20 per cent for all companies combined.
Gross internal Financing and Expenditures
on Plant and Equiptnent
A comparison of gross internal financing with gross expenditures on
plant and equipment is made in Charts 12 and 13. Internal funds are
not, of course, always used exclusively for financing fixed assets, nor
are fixed assets always financed internally. Yet, throughout 1900—1953,
gross retained funds differed from plant and equipment outlays by
only a small margin (total gross retentions were $180 billion, and total
expenditures amounted to $163 billion—or 91 per cent of retentions).
However, the differences are considerably larger for individual cycles
(for example, in both world war cycles, gross internal financing was
roughly 1.5 times as high as plant and equipment expenditures; see
Chart 12 and Table 39). In all the nonwar cycles, the ratio was con-
siderably lower. In the cycles before World War I, internal funds fell
short of plant and equipment expenditures. In the interwar period,
internal financing exceeded expenditures in cyclesthat included
relatively mild recessions but fell short of expenditures in cycles that
included major depressions (especially in the early thirties). Finally, in
the cycles following World War II, internal funds were greater than
expenditures by a considerable margin.
In contrast to the behavior of gross internal financing, the ratio of
13 Ct. Albert R. Koch, The Financing of Large Corporations, 1920—1939, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1943, pp. 94—95. See also Table 42, below.
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security issuesto capital expenditures, measured either trough-to-
trough or peak-to-peak, has declined. Security issues amounted to
slightly more than 50 per cent of plant and equipment expenditures
in the 1900—1904 (1899—1903) cycle. In 1926—1929, the ratio was only
35 per cent; in the two most recent cycles, only slightly over 20 per cent.
Charts 12 and 13 show that, in the pre-Worid War II cycles, the ratio
CHART 12
Gross Internal Financing and New Security Issues as Percentages of
Plant and Equipment Expenditures, All Manufacturing and Mining
Corporations, 1900—1953
Per cent
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Source: Table 40.
ofgross internal financing to expenditures was much higher for large
corporations than for all corporations. Gross internal financing of large
corporations exceeded their plant and equipment expenditures by a
considerable margin even during the thirties, when for all corpora-
tions, gross internal financing dropped to practically one-half of such
expenditures. In the World War II cycle, the ratio for large corpora-
tions was approximately the same as that for all corporations; but in
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New security issues of large corporations were higher in relation to
their plant and equipment expenditures in the 1914—1919 and 1919—
1921 cycles than were security issues of all manufacturing and mining,
CHART13
Gross Internal Financing and New Security Issues as
Percentages of Plant and Equipment Expenditures, Large
Manufacturing Corporations, 1914—1953
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Source: Table 44 for gross internal and security financing; for
plant and equipment expenditures, see the source note to Table 43.
butthe reverse was true in most of the later cycles. As already men-
tioned above, the relatively low level of security issues of large corpora-
tions in the late twenties is especially noteworthy. In the postwar
periods, the ratio of security issuesto plant and equipment ex-
penditures was slightly lower for large firms than for the entire
industry.
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long-term funds, one would expect the demand for long-term external
financing to depend largely on how high such expenditures are in
relation to the available internal financing. When the ratio of internal
funds to plant and equipment outlays is high, the demand for long-
term external funds should be low; when the ratio is low, the demand
for long-term external funds should be stronger.
Our data Confirm this expectation: the relation between the ratio of
gross internal financing to plant and equipment expenditures and that
of new security issues to total long-term financing (internal funds plus
security issues) is clearly inverse (see Chart 14, panel A). The ratio of
internal financing to expenditures was especially high in the two war
cycles; the ratio of security issues to total financing was then lower
than in any other cycle except that of 1932—1938. On the other hand,
the ratio of security issues to the total was highest in the 1900—1904
and 1919—1921 cycles, both characterized by relatively low plant and
equipment expenditures.
The cycle of the Great Depression (1932—1938) is the only one not
conforming to the general pattern of relationship. Then, as Chart 14
shows, there was an outflow of external funds (retirements exceeding
new issues), although gross internal financing fell far short of plant and
equipment expenditures. This is accounted for by the substantial con-
traction and partial conversion into cash of such current assets as
marketable securities, receivables, and inventories, which took place in
that period. The cash enabled many companies with sharply diminished
retained earnings to maintain a minimum of required plant and equip-
ment expenditures without recourse to the securities market.
The regression line, fitted by the least squares method to all the
cycles except 1932—1938, indicates that, on the average, security issues
amounted to 30 per cent of the total long-term financing when internal
funds were equal to three-fourths of plant and equipment expenditures;
23 per cent of the total, when internal funds were equal to the full
amount of the expenditures; and only 10 per cent of the total, when
internal funds were one and one-half times as large as the expenditures.
Thus, new security issues represented an appreciable share of total
new financing even when gross internal funds exceeded plant and
equipment expenditures. Many individual companies had low retained
income and had to rely largely on external financing even during
cycles in which the ratio of retained income to expenditures was high
for the industry as a whole. Furthermore, some companies with a high
ratio of retained earnings to plant expenditures still needed substantial
external financing to strengthen their working capital position or to
make new investment in subsidiaries. For example, in the twenties,
large corporations considerably expanded their financial interests (by
127CHART 14
All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations: Relation between New
Security Issues as a Percentage of Total Long-Term Financing and Gross
Internal Financing as a Percentage of Plant and Ecuimen-t Expenditures,
1900—1953
(based on averages during positive business cycles)
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investment and loan) in subsidiary companies; the relatively high ratios
of security issues to internal financing reflect this activity.
Deviations from the regression line of the security issues-total long-
term financing ratio show no persistent trend over 1900—1953 (see
Chart 14, panel B). The deviations were negative from the 1927—1932
cycle on. However, there is a cluster of positive deviations during 1914—
1924. The ratio of gross internal financing to plant and equipment
expenditures was approximately the same for both war cycles, but the
ratio of security issues to total long-term financing was much lower in
the second. In the 1946—1949 and 1949—1953 cycles, the ratio of internal
financing to expenditures was approximately the same as in the 1921—
1924 and 1924—1927 cycles. But again, the ratio of security issues to the
total was substantially lower in the recent cycles.
Since gross internal financing was high in relation to plant and
equipment expenditures in the postwar cycles, security issues would be
expected to represent a relatively small fraction of total financing. The
actual ratio of security issues to the total was, however, even lower than
the "normal" computed from the regression line fitted to the whole
period, 1900—1953.
We conclude this section with a brief examination of changes in
total long-term financing (the sum of gross internal financing and new
security issues) over the whole period.1'
As Charts 12 and 13 indicate, long-term financing exceeded plant
and equipment expenditures by a substantial margin in almost all the
cycles. The data for all manufacturing and mining corporations indi-
cate that only in the thirties (the 1927—1932 and 1932—1938 cycles) did
the inflow of long-term funds decline to a level far below that of the
expenditures. For large manufacturing corporations, on the other hand,
total long-term financing exceeded plant and equipment expenditures
throughout 1914—1953.
For all manufacturing and mining corporations, no trend in the
ratio of long-term financing to plant and equipment expenditures can
be discerned for the entire period, 1900—1953, either in trough-to-
trough or peak-to-peak cycle data. The ratio was highest in the World
War I cycle (1914—1919 or 1913—1918) (long-term financing was 1.8
times as high as expenditures—see Table 40). During the World War II
cycles (1938—1946 or 1937—1944), the ratio was approximately 1.5—
about the same as the highest ratio attained during the interwar period.
14Inrecent years, the sum of internal financing and new security issues falls short
of total noncurrent financing of corporations, because it does not include term
loans (see Chapter VII for a discussion of term loans). Commercial banks began
making long-term loans to industry on a significant scale in the middle thirties.
However, the data on such loans are rather scant. The available estimates indicate
that the amount has been small in relation to security issues in the postwar period.
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In the two postwar cycles, the ratio declined moderately. However, the
figure obtained for 1946—1953 (132 per cent) exceeded that found for
1900—1914 (118 per cent) although far short of that for 1919—1929
(145 per cent).
In general, total long-term financing showed no clear trend in rela-
tion to plant and equipment expenditures. But the relative importance
of the internal and the external components shifted appreciably. In-
ternal funds became relatively more important, while funds raised
through security issues declined in relation to both total financing and
plant expenditures.'5
Although the ratio of new security issues to gross internal financing
in the postwar period was lower than those for 1900—1914 and 1919—
1929, it was much higher than the ratio for 1936—1940. Does the rise
observed after World War II represent the beginning of a new long
swing? Since the general institutional framework of our economy seems
to foreshadow a continued heavy reliance by corporations on internal
financing, a prolonged upward movement in the ratio of external to
internal funds could hardly be expected. However, if the national
economy continues to expand at a relatively high rate, the demand for
new external funds will probably remain substantial. Only if further
economic growth were retarded could a drop in the relative importance
of new external financing be expected.
Components of Gross Internal Financing
Gross internal financing, as considered above, represents the sum of:
(1) depreciation and depletion allowances and (2) undistributed net
profit. We now turn to a separate examination of each.
DEPRECIATION AND DEPLETION. In a simple conceptual framework,
depreciation and depletion allowances, if earned, represent funds re-
tained from the gross revenue stream to make up for the loss incurred
through capital consumption. But, of course, the allowances computçd
by conventional accounting methods may differ significantly from the
actual loss of value through use. This occurs especially during periods
of wide price fluctuations, when replacement costs deviate substantially
from the original expenditures on durable capital goods.
In studies of real capital formation, depreciation data must be ad-
justed so as to represent, as accurately as possible, real capital con-
sumption. On the other hand, these adjustments are unnecessary in
an examination of the financial aspects of investment; the actual
15 The figures on security issues considered in this section represent the gross in-
flow of funds through security transactions. Net inflow of external funds (adjusted
for changes in financial assets) is discussed in the last section of this chapter.
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TABLE 41
All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations: Depreciation and Depletion
Allowances and Retained Net Profit, 1900—1953
Depreciation as Percentage of
Depredation Plus
Depreciation and
Depletion Retained Net Profit
Retained Net Profit
(Cot. 1) ÷ (Cot. 2) ±





(Cot. 3)] (Cot. 4)]
Unadjusted Adjusted
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLESb
1900—1904$260 $300 $459 $439 36.2% 40.6%
1904—1908 364 436 417 357 46.7 55.0
1908—1911 488 569 474 415 50.7 57.8
1911—1914 616 633 485 506 55.9 55.6
1914—19191,170 1,366 1,968 1,038 37.3 56.8
1919—19211,612 2270 618 1,475 72.3 60.6
1921—19241,907 2,168 374 544 83.6 79.9
1924—19272,161 2,308 863 1,091 71.5 67.9
1927—1932 2,306 2,310 —988 —14 175.0 100.6
1932—1938 1,889 1,729 —683 —824 156.6 191.0
1938-19402,763 2,769 2,002 1,447 58.0 65.7
1946—19494,083 4,526 5,687 3,347 41.8 57.5
1949_1954c6,581 7,206 4,497 3,220 59.4 69.1
INVERTED BUSINESS CYCLESb
1899—1903°244 284 461 434 34.6 39.6
1903—1907 335 396 421 379 44.3 51.1
1907—1910 449 531 444 340 50.3 61.0
1910—1913 574 630 500 492 53.4 56.1
1913—1918 988 1,067 1,671 1,019 37.2 51.2
1918—1920 1,568 2,181 1,867 1,226 45.6 64.0
1920—1923 1,782 2,189 —87 691 105.1 76.0
1923—19262,079 2,255 933 969 69.0 69.9
1926—1929 2,333 2,430 662 851 77.9 74.1
1929—1937 2,018 1,890 —1,264 —824 267.6 177.3
1937—19442,437 2,412 1,614 1,301 60.2 65.0
1944—19483,629 3,876 4,008 1,894 47.5 67.2
1948—19536,052 6,627 4,817 3,739 55.7 63.9
SELECTEI) PERIODS
1900—1914 417 466 448 427 48.2 52.2
1919—1929 2,011 2,290 744 906 73.0 71.7
1936—19402,002 1,892 241 350 89.3 84.4
1946—1953 5,411 5,941 4,889 3,091 52.5 65.8
aIn computing averages for business cycle periods, values for terminal years are
weighted by one-half for complete cycles. For incomplete cycles, only values at peak or
trough terminal years are weighted by one-half.
b Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.
(continued)
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allowances, irrespective of whether they adequately cover replacement
requirements, are the object of study. Of course, one may also wish to
compare the actual allowances with the theoretically adequate ones.
The data for both reported and adjusted depreciation, 1900—1953,
are presented in Table 41 and Chart 15. Reported depreciation16 was
lower than the adjusted amount in all the cycles except that of 1932—
1938(or1929—1937, peak-to-peak),thatis,the allowances were,
generally, too iow to cover actual capital consumption. However, the
differences are not pronounced. Both exhibit an almost uninterrupted
growth throughout 1900—1953. In contrast, retained net profit fluctuated
markedly.
The unadjusted depreciation allowances were smaller than unad-
justed retained net profit in 1900—1904 and 1904—1908 (prior to 1909,
when the federal income tax on corporations was introduced, deprecia-.
tion accounting was very imperfect), in the World War I cycle, and,
once again, in 1946—1949. In all the other cycles, depreciation exceeded
net profit retention. Throughout 1900—1953, the amount of deprecia-
tion was 1.7 times as great as the amount of net profit retained. This
large difference is mainly due to the large. amount of net corporate
dissaving in 1921 and during the thirties. However, even when the
years of net dissaving are omitted, depreciation for all the remaining
years exceeds retained net profit by 19 per cent.
Adjusted depreciation is greater than net profit retention in all the
cycles except those of 1900—1904 (trough-to-trough) and 1899—1903
Average covers 1949—1953.
d Averages cover 1900—1903.
Column Source
I and 3Appendix Table C-2.
2 and 4Depreciation and depletion adjustments in column (2) include conversion from
the original to a replacement cost basis and, in 1940—1947, elimination of excess
depreciation resulting from accelerated write-offs of war facilities.
Retained net profit adjustments in column (4) include the depreciation and
depletion adjustments plus adjustments for inventory gains and losses, excess
development cost in mining, excess capital expenditures charged to current
expenses, and capital gains and losses.
The adjustments are based on data in Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of
Savings in theUnitedStales, Princeton University Press, 1955, Vol. I; Statistics oj
Income, Bureau of Internal Revenue (now Internal Revenue Service), Part 2;
and National Income, 1954 Edition, A Supplement to the Survey of Current Business,
Department of Commerce.
16 "Depreciation" will designate the total of depreciation and depletion. Deple-
tion allowances are a major component of internal financing in mining but are of
lesser importance in manufacturing. For both industries combined, depletion has,
in recent years, amounted to approximately 29 per cent of the total amount of
depreciation and depletion accruals and approximately 15 per cent of gross internal
financing.
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CHARTIS
All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations: Depreciation and Depletion
Allowances, and Retained Net Profit, 1900—1953
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Source: Depreciation and retained net profit (reported and adjusted) from Table 41;
plant and equipment expenditures from Table 40.
(peak-to-peak).Throughout 1900—1953, adjusted depreciation was 2.4
times as great as the adjusted retained net profit.
The ratios of depreciation to plant and equipment expenditures
show wide fluctuations. As Chart 15 reveals, the ratio rose substantially
during the first two decades, but the reverse tendency set in during the
thirties. Other things being equal, a rise in the ratios indicates that a
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correspondingly, less represents net expansion, of fixed assets (on the
assumption that depreciation is a rough measure of actual capital con-
sumption). Conversely, a decline indicates the reverse tendency.
Owing to lack of data, we could not compute the rates of growth of
fixed assets for successive business cycles, or even successive decades.
However, we do have average rates of expansion of all assets other than
securities for several consecutive periods (in Table 38). When the ratios
of depreciation to plant and equipment expenditures are computed
for these periods, the following results are obtained:
Rate of Asset Ratio of Depreciation to









a See Table 38. Assets are net of depreciation reserves.
b Depreciation data (unadjusted) are from Appendix Table C-2, and plant and
equipment expenditures data are from Appendix Table C-3.
As expected, the depreciation-expenditures ratios were highest (1919—
1929 and 1929—1937) when the asset expansion rates were lowest.
Depreciation accruals exceeded plant and equipment expenditures in
1929—1937——a period of net contraction rather than expansion of assets.
Although depreciation-expenditures ratios were higher in 1937—1948
and 1948—1953 than in 1900—1909 and 1909—1914, asset expansion rates
in both recent periods were above those in the early periods. Deprecia-
tion was high in relation to expenditures in 1937—1948 and 1948—1953
not because expenditures were low, but because the rates at which
depreciable fixed assets were written off rose considerably after World
War I. In fact, the expenditures on new assets have been so large in
recent years that, even with faster write-offs, the net amount of assets
increased at relatively high rates.
NET PROFIT RETENTION. Conceptually, the retained part of net profit
represents funds available for net asset expansion, i.e., expansion after
replacement 'requirements have been taken care of. But an accurate
computation of net asset expansion isdifficult. Any inaccuracy in
computing depreciation results in a corresponding inaccuracy in the
amount of net profit. For example, if the depreciation allowance in
a given year were lower than actual replacement requirements by
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1billion,then net profit and retained profit in that year would be
overstated by $1 billion.17
Furthermore, the question arises whether net profit and retained
rofit should include such items as capital gains (or losses) and in-
ventory profits (or losses) resulting from price changes. In any analysis
of real investment and saving, itis appropriate to eliminate these
gains. From the financial standpoint, on the other hand, capital gains
represent a real source of funds to the business firms concerned, and
sales from inventories at higher prices also provide additional funds—
though not necessarily additional physical stocks if the costs are also
rising. For the sake of comparison, both the adjusted and the un-
adjusted data are presented here.
In contrast to depreciation, retained net profit (both reported and
adjusted) exhibits very wide intercycle variation over the period
CHART16
All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations: Retained Net Profits and
New Security Issues,900-1953
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Source: Retained net profit, reported and adjusted from Table 41; new security
issued from Table 40.
'' Ofcourse, if the depreciation had been increased by $1 billion in that year,
and if the higher amount had been accepted by the government for tax purposes,
net profit after taxes would have been reduced by less than $1 billion because the
tax liability would have been lowered. But when depredation data, reported by
corporations, are later adjusted by economists, the amount of the tax payment
remains unchanged. Therefore, any such adjustment of depreciation calls for an
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(Table 4l).18 The cycle averages were relatively stable before World
War I, rose steeply in 1914—1919, and declined in the interwar period
(Chart 16). In the twenties, retentions were substantial. On the other
hand, net corporate dissaving characterized the 1927—1932 and 1932—
1938 cycles. The upswing that unadjusted net retentions registered in
the World War II and the postwar cycles was less pronounced, but still
substantial, in the adjusted profit data.
Net retentions (both adjusted and unadjusted) have afargreater
amplitude of fluctuation than new security issues. However, most of
the movements from one cycle to the following were in the same direc-
tion in both series: a rise in net profit retention was associated with a
rise in new security issues, and vice versa. The conformity between the
two series is closer when adjusted profit data are used.
Even though changes in the dollar amounts were generally in the
same direction, the relative importance of internal and external funds
showed wide variation owing to differences in the degree of change
from one cycle to the next. The ratio of new security issues to un-
adjusted profit retention was especially low in the World War I and
World War II cycles (see Table 42): in 1914—1919 (trough-to-trough
cycle) security finaicing amounted to only one-fourth of retained net
profit; in 1913—1918 (peak-to-peak cycle), slightly more than one-fifth.
During the second war cycle, new security issues were even less im-
portant: 10 per cent in 1938—1946 (trough-to-trough) and 7 per cent in
1937—1944 (peak-to-peak) of net profit retention.
If war cycles are omitted, security issues compared with unadjusted
profits exhibit the following general tendencies:
1. In all the cycles preceding World War I, the amount of new
security issues was lower than the amount of net profit retained (un-
adjustdd data). For the entire 1900—1914 period, security financing was
68 per cent of net profit retention.
2. In the twenties, security financing showed a considerable gain in
relative importance. New security issues exceeded retained net profit
in 1919—1921, 1921—1924 and 1924—1927 (trough-to-trough cycles) and
in 1926—1929 (peak-to-peak cycle).'9 Over the entire 1919—1929 period,
security financing amounted to 126 per cent of net profit retention.
3. In the thirties, net corporate profit retention gave place to
corporatedissaving(netprofitaftertaxes and dividendswere
18Theyear-to-year variation is even wider. We use cycle averages and thereby
eliminate the differences between the expansion and the contraction years within
the business cycles.
'9In1923—1926 (peak-to-peak cycle) the amount of new issues was lower than the
amount of retained net profit, but the ratio ol security financing to net profit
retention was higher than the corresponding ratio in all prewar cycles except that
of 1899—1903.
136TABLE 42
Ratio to Net Plant and Equipment Expansiona of Retained Net Profit and
of New Security Issues, and Ratio of New Security Issues to Retained Net
Profit, All Manufacturing and Mining Corporations, 1900—1953
(per cent)
Un-
adjusted New Adjusted New
RetainedSecurity
Net ProfitIssues
As per Cent of Un-
New Security




As per Cent of Adjusted
New Security
issues as per Cent
of Adjusted
adjusted Net Plant andRetained NetNet Plant and Equip-Retained Net
Equipment Expansion Profit ment Expansion Profit
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLESb
1900—190484.5 75.9 89.8 87.3 81.9 93.8
1904—190865.4 40.1 61.4 63.1 45.2 71.7
1908—1911 82.0 54.8 66.9 83.5 63.8 76.4
191 1—1914 84.9 47.5 55.9 91.3 48.9 53.6
1914—1919225.9 56.0 24.8 153.8 72.3 47.0
1919—192156.5 113.5 201.0 338.3 284.9 84.2
1921—1924196.8 351.6 178.6 n.c. n.c. 122.8
1924—1927217.9 220.5 101.2 438.2 350.6 80.0
1927—1932n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c.
1932—1938n.c. n.c. nc. n.c. n.c. n.c.
1938—1946490.7 50.5 10.3 360.0 51.2 14.2
1946—1949132.3 45.0 34.0 86.8 50.2 57.8
1949_1954c120.7 57.1 47.3 103.8 68.6 66.1
INVERTED BUSINESS CYCLESb
1899_1903d84.3 76.1 90.2 85.6 82.1 95.9
1903—190768.3 41.6 60.8 68.3 46.1 67,5
1907—1910136.6 88.6 64.9 139.9 118.5 84.7
1910—1913166.1 109.0 65.6 200.8 133.9 66.7
1913—1918227.7 49.7 21.8 155.6 55.7 35.8
1918—1920144.4 82.0 56.8 180.3 155.9 86.5
1920—1923n.c. 219.1 n.e. n.e. n.e. 122.7
1923—1926290.7 234.6 80.7 668.3 519.3 77.7
1926—1929137.9 210.0 152.3 222.2 362.2 118.4
1929—1 937n.c. n.e. n.c. n.e. n.e. n.e.
1937—1944625.6 41.5 6.6 459.7 37.8 8.2
1944—1948142.9 48.0 33.6 74.0 52.6 71.1
1948—1953131.9 57.5 43.6 121.6 68.3 56.2
SELECTED PERIODS
1900—191477.6 53.2 68.5 81.0 58.3 71.9
1919—1929136.8 172.6 126.2 341.9 354.3 103.6
1936—194055.9 36.2 64.7 64.7 28.8 44.6
1946—1953123.5 51.9 42.0 90.1 59.9 66.5
n.e. =notcomputed when numerator, denominator, or both, are negative.
a Net plant and equipment expansion equals plant and equipment expenditures less
adjusted or unadjusted depreciation.
b Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.
Underlying data cover 1949—1953.
° Underlying data cover 1900—1903.
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negative). New security financing showed a small negative balance
(retirements being larger than new issues) in 1932—1938 (trough-to-
trough cycle) but a small positive balance in 1929—1937 (peak-to-peak
cycle).
4. In the cycles following World War IL new security issues were
much lower in relation to net profit retention than in any previous
nonwar cycle. For 1946—1953 (one full and one incomplete cycle),
security financing was only 42 per cent of net profit retained.
The relative behavior of external and internal funds was sub-
stantially different in years when the excess profit tax was in effect
compared to years when it was not. During 1946—1950, when the tax
was not in effect, security issues were only 28 per cent of retained net
profit. During 1951—1953, when the tax was again imposed, retentions
contracted sharply; and the ratio of security issues to retentions rose to
72 per cent. Clearly, changes in the corporate tax load have been—and
doubtless will be in the future—a significant factor in the determina-
tion of the relative importance of internal and external corporate
financing.
The trend in the ratio of security issues to retained net profit for
large manufacturing corporations is generally similar to that for all
corporations (Table 43). However, there are some significant differences
between the two series. For large corporations, the ratio was very high
in the early twenties (1920—1 923) and relatively low in the late twenties.
In contrast, the ratio for all corporations reached an all-time high in
the 1926—1929 cycle. In the thirties, net profits of large corporations
dropped substantially but remained positive, and this enabled them to
continue net profit retention; however, all corporations showed net
dissaving. New security issues of the large concerns also remained
positive in the 1932—1938 cycle, but all corporations combined had a
negative balance. In the postwar period, the ratio of security issues to
retained net profit was somewhat lower for large corporations than for
all corporations.
When adjusted profit figures are substituted for the unadjusted ones,
the relative importance of internal and external funds changes (see
Table 42). In both war cycles, the ratio of new security issues to re-
tained net profits rose substantially because of our downward profit
adjustments. However, it was still much lower than the ratios for all
the nonwar cycles.
On the nonwar cycles, the following general observations may be
made:
1. Before World War I, small downward profit adjustments were
made, and the ratio of new security issues to retained net profit is,
therefore, slightly increased. For the entire 1900—1914 period, the value
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TABLE 43
Ratio to Net Plant and Equipment Expansiona of Retained Net Profit and of
New Security Issues, and Ratio of New Security Issues to Retained Net Profit,
Large Manufacturing Corporations, 1900—1954
(per cent)
New Security
Retained Net Profit Issues
Is
New Security
sues as per Cent
of Retained As per Cent of New Plant and
Period Equipment Expaneioe Net Profit
. SELECTED PERIOD
1900—1910 330.1 229.4 69.5
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLESb
1914_1919c 259.4 79.1 30.5
1919—1921 94.7 79.7 84.1
1921_1924d 209.8 159.8 76.2
1924—1927 210.4 41.8 19.9
1927—1932 182.9 39.9 21.8
1932—1938 176.3 94.2 53.5
1938_1946e 284.2 5.8 2.0
1946—1949 96.8 33.8 34.9 •
1949—l954 105.5 31.6 299
INVERTED BUSINESS CYCLES5 .
1913_19 286.5 68.1 23.8
1918—1920 147.5 93.9 63.7
l920—1923 78.2 100.6 128.7
1923—1926 269.9 62.9 23.3
1926—1929 218.4 24.9 11.4
1929—1937 157.5 71.7 45.5
1937—1944' 323.2 33.2 10.3
1944-1948 100.9 34.9 34.6
1948—1953 109.8 30.4 27.7
a Net plant and equipment expansion equals plant and equipment expenditures less
depreciation.
b Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.
Underlying data cover 1915—1919.
d Underlying data cover 1922—1924.
Underlying data cover 1939—1946, Federal Reserve Board sample.
Underlying data cover 1949—1953.
gUnderlyingdata cover 1915—1918.
h Underlying data cover 1920—1922.
Underlying data cover 1937—1943, National Bureau of Economic Research sample.
Source: 1900—1910: Sample of 14 large manufacturing corporations; 1915—1922: Data
Book of Financial Research Program, National Bureau of Economic Research, Section A,
Table 87, p. 154; 1922—1943: ibid., Section A, Table 120, pp. 278—279; 1939—1953: Federal
Reserve Bulletin, July 1953 and August 1954.
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of security financing is 72 per cent of the adjusted amount of retained
net profit.
2. In 1919—1929, our adjustments raise both net profit and retained
profit. Consequently, the relative importance of security financing com-
pared with adjusted retentions declines. (But security issues over this
period still exceed—by 4 per cent—retained net profit.)
3. The amount of net corporate dissaving during the thirties is re-
duced by profit adjustments. However, the adjusted data still show a
substantial negative balance of net internal financing and a small
positive balance of security financing.
4. In the postwar period, retained net profit is substantially lower
because of profit adjustments. Yet the ratio of new security issues to
adjusted profit retention is considerably lower for the postwar cycles
than for most other nonwar cycles. For the entire 1946—1953 period,
security financing was 66 per cent of retained net profit—much less
than for 1900—1914 and 1919—1929.
In conclusion, examination of the relations between retained net
profit and new security issues, on the one hand, and net expansion of
plant and equipment (total expenditure less depreciation), on the
other, shows that the adjusted ratios differ significantly from the un-
adjusted ones in some of the cycles. However, both series have generally
similar long-run tendencies (Table 42). Before World War I, the ratios
of retained net profit (unadjusted and adjusted) to plant expansion
and of new security issues to plant expansion were relatively low. Both
ratios rose substantially during the war and the twenties .The thirties
were characterized by net corporate dissaving as well as net contraction
of plant and equipment. In the World War II cycle, the profit retention
ratio was again very high (the security ratio was relatively low) and
then dropped sharply in the postwar period. The postwar ratios were
much lower than those for the twenties, although higher than those for
cycles before the first war.
The difference between the recent cycles and those before 1914 is
considerably larger in the unadjusted than in the adjusted series,
although the change is in the same direction. The ratio of security
issues to plant and equipment expansion showed a slight increase in
the postwar period, although the level remained well below that
reached in the twenties and was no higher than in the cycles preceding
World War I.
Most of the variables considered in this section display exceedingly
wide fluctuations from one cycle to another. Major long-term changes
in their relationships show more clearly when averages are computed
for periods containing several business cycles (see Table 42). The
relative magnitudes of retained net profit, security issues, and plant
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expansion for 1946—1953werecloser to those for 1900—1914 than to
those for either 1919—1929 or 1936—1940, especially if the ratios based
on adjusted profit data are compared. The ratio of retained net profit
to plant and equipment expansion was higher in 1946—1953 than in
1900—1914, although not nearly so high as in 1919—1929. The ratio of
new security issues to retained net profit was lower in 1946—1953 than
in 1900—1919. It was relatively high in 1919—1929 owing to an un-
usually large volume of new security flotations.
Total Short-Term and Long-Term External Financing
We now turn to the available data on total external financing, which
includes funds obtained through security sales plus several other im-
portant components. Balance sheets and profit and loss statements are
available for samples of large manufacturing corporations for the entire
period, 1900—1953. However, the size and composition of the samples
differ substantially in different periods: 1900—1910 includes only 14
large corporations; 1915—1922, 50; and 1922—1943, 44. (These three
samples were compiled at the National Bureau.) For 1939—1953, a
sample of about 200 corporations, compiled by the Federal Reserve
Board, is used.
The statements of sources and uses of funds prepared for the samples
permit an analysis of new financing absorbed by large manufacturing
corporations. Although the samples are not identical, some conclusions
about major financial trends can be reached by inspecting changes in
the ratios of different types of funds to total financing.
Gross External Financing
In their usual form, statements of sources and uses of funds indicate
the inflow (or outflow) of funds from various sources (gross of changes
in the financial assets). For example, a statement for a given company
shows an inflow of $100 million through stock and bond issues. This
means that new issues exceeded retirements (and purchases of own stock
to be held in the treasury) by this amount over the period concerned.
If, during the same period, the company purchased $50 million
worth of securities of other corporations, the amount will be shown as
a use of funds on the other side of the statement. The net inflow of
funds through security transactions (funds received from the capital
market throughsecuritysaleslessthe amount releasedtothe
capital market through security purchases) is the remainder after the
$50 million on the "uses" side is subtracted from the $100 million on
the "sources" side.
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We consider,first,the relation between internal and external
Financing, without an adjustment for financial asset acquisitions. No
clear trend is evident in the relative importance of internal and ex-
ternal financing of large corporations during the period (Table 44). In
TABLE 44




Internal Financing External Financing
UndistributedDepre- Short-Long-
Financing TotalNet Profitciation Total Term Term
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SELECTED PERIOD
1900—1910$1,207.0 $850.0$472.0$378.0 $357.0$ 29.0$328.0
PER CENT OF TOTAL FINANCING
1900—1910 100.0% 70.4%39.1%31.3% 29.6%2.4%27.2%
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLE AVERAOESa
1914_1919b$743.5 $447.1$322.4$124.6 $296.5$194.7$101.8
1919—1921 371.8 367.8 212.5 155.2 4.0—174.3 178.2
1921_1924c 502.4 395.2 182.3 212.9 107.2—30.0 137.2
1924-1927 705.8 644.2 332.9 311.5 61.4 —5.8 67.2
1927—1932 507.1 574.4 170.5 403.9 —67.3 —104.9 37.7
1932—1938 623.4 4956 76.5 419.1 127.8 86.9 40.9
19381946d3,093.0 2,348.01,083.01,265.0 745.0664,0 81.0
1946—19496,066.0 4,145.02,550.01,595.0 1,920.0908.01,012.0
1949_1954e8,635.0 5,675.03,036.02,639.02,959.02,013.0947.0
PER CENT OF TOTAL FINANCING
1914_1919b 100.0% 60.1%43.4% 16.8% 39.9%26.2%13.7%
1919—1921 100.0 98.9 57.2 41.7 1.1—46.9 47.9
1921_1924C 100.0 78.7 36.3 42.4 21.3 —6.0 27.3
1924—1927 100.0 91.3 47.2 44.1 8.7 —0.8 9.5
1927—1932 100.0 113.3 33.6 79.7 —13.3—20.7 7.4
1932—1938 100.0 79.5 12.3 67.2 20.5 13.9 6.6
1938_1946d 100.0 75.9 35.0 40.9 24.1 21.5 2.6
1946—1949 100.0 68.3 42.0 26.3 31.7 15.0 16.7
1949_1954e 100.0 65.7 35.2 30.5 34.3 23.3 11.0
INVERTED BUSINESS CYCLE AvERAclasa
1913—1918k$782.3 $450.7$336.1$114.6 $331.6$246.6$ 85.0
1918—1920 557.9 444.7 286.7 158.0 113.2—67.6180.8
190_1923 174.1 240.8 86.3 154.5 —66.7 —177.7 111.0
1923—1926 672.3 576.0 305.8 270.2 96.3 25.1 71.2
1926—1929 804.4 779.2 395.3 383.9 25.2—22.9 48.1
1929—1937 464.1 445.4 36.7 408.7 18.7 2.2 16.5
1937_1944h1,412.2 897.5 381.7 515.9 514.6465.9 48.7
1944—19483,625.0 3,171.01,663.01,508.0 454.0 —252.0706.0
1948—19538,110.0 5,433.03,027.02,406.02,676.01,785.0892.0
(continued)
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TABLE 44 (concluded)
Total
Internal Financing External. Financing
Undistributed Depre- Short- Long-
. Financing Total Net Profitciation Total Term Term
Period (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1913—1918 100.0%
PER CENT OF TOTAL FINANCING
57.6%43.0% 14.6% 42.4%31.5%10.9%
1918—1920 100.0 79.7 51.4 28.3 20.3 —12.1 32.4
1920—1923 100.0 138.3 49.6 88.7 —38.3 —102.1 63.8
1923—1926 100.0 85.7 45.5 40.2 14.3 3.7 10.6
1926—1929 100.0 96.9 49.1 47.7 3.1 —2.8 6.0
1929—1937 100.0 96.0 7.9 88.1 4.0 0.5 3.6
1937—1944 100.0 63.6 27.0 36.5 36.4 33.0 3.4
1944—1948 100.0 87.5 45.9 41.6 12.5 —7.0 19.5
1948—1953 100.0 67.0 37.3 29.7 33.0 22.0 11.0
a Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology. In com-
puting averages, values for terminal years are weighted by one-half for complete cycles.
For incomplete cycles, only values at peak or trough terminal years are weighted by
one-half.
b Underlying data cover 1915—1919.
Underlying data cover 1922—1924.
d Underlysng data cover 1939—1946, Federal Reserve Board sample.
Underlying data cover 1949—1953.
Underlying data cover 1915—1918.
Underlying data cover 1920—1922.
h Underlying data cover 1937—1943, National Bureau of Economic Research sample.
Source: Same as Table 43.
fact, the ratio of gross internal to total new financing during 1948—1953
(67 per cent) was close to the corresponding ratio during 1900—1910
(70 per cent). However, considerably higher ratios are obtained for the
interwar period. In the 1920—1923 cycle, gross internal financing
amounted to 138 per cent of the total, indicating that the inflow of
internal funds was accompanied by a substantial outflow of external
funds through repayment of loans, retirement of securities, etc. In
1926—1929 and 1929—1937, gross internal financing represented almost
100 per cent of the total (external financing was of negligible relative
importance). The ratio of gross internal to total financing declined in
the World War II cycle, and the postwar ratios compared with the
interwar ratios remained relatively low. However, the ratio for the
World War II cycle was higher than that for the World War I cycle.
The ratio of retained net profit to total new financing likewise lacks
a definite trend. During the twenties, net profit retention was especially
high relative to the other components but dropped to a very low level
in the thirties. The ratio for the World War II cycle was substantially
lower than that for the World War I cycle. The ratios for 1946—1949
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and 1949—1953 were considerably below the highest ratios for the
twenties but fairly close to the figure for 1901—1910.
The significance of the changes that took place over the half-century
can be seen more clearly if the short-term and long-term components of
external financing are examined separately. The short-term component
represents the sum of changes in current liabilities: mainly, short-term
bank loans, accounts payable, and accrued items. The long-term com-
ponent is equal to the sum of changes in long-term loans and securities
outstanding (both stocks and bonds).
Short-term external financing was substantial only in the two war
cycles (1914—1919 and 19381946) and the two cycles following World
War 11(1946—1949 and 1949—1954). In contrast, during 1901—1910, the
inflow of short-term funds was relatively unimportant, and in the inter-
war period, most cycles were characterized by negative balances (net
decreases in current liabilities).
As the following table indicates, the rise in the relative importance
of short-term funds in the war and postwar cycles was largely accounted
for by increased accruals for income tax purposes:
Positive Business Cycle Averages
(dollars in millions)
Total Short-Term Increase in (Col. 2) as per Cent
Financinga Tax Liabilityb of (Col. 1)
Period (1) (2) (3)
1914—1919 $195 $90 46
1938—1946 664 220 33
1946—1949 908 396 44
1949_1954c 2,013 1,084 54
a Average from Table 44, column 6.
bSourcessame as those in Table 44.
Underlying data cover 1949—1953.
The rise in tax accruals during the two war cycles was due partly to
higher taxable income and partly to higher tax rates. Corporate profits
before taxes expanded along with the general volume of production.
At the same time, the corporate income tax rates were raised and
special wartime excess profit taxes were imposed in both periods. The
increase in tax liability in the 1946—1949 cycle, on the other hand, was
due entirely to profit expansion. The wartime excess profit tax was
repealed at the end of 1945, and the income tax rate for corporations
remained unchanged (at 38 per cent, including the surtax) during
1946—1949. Finally, in the 1949—1954 cycle, which included the years
of the Korean conflict, both factors were at work again: profits ex-
panded and the tax rates were increased once more. A new eycess profit
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tax was imposed in 1950, and the income tax and surtax rate were
raised to 42 per cent in 1950 and to 52 per cent in 1951.
Although changes in the tax liability were important, other com-
ponents of short-term financing (mainly bank and trade credit) also
showed substantial increases in all four cycles. In fact, even if the tax
accruals are excluded from short-term financing, the ratio of the re-
maining short-term components to total financing is higher for these
cycles than is the ratio of all short-term components (including tax
accruals) to total financing for most of the remaining cycles.
The ratio of long-term external financing to total new financing has
a downward trend throughout 1900—1953. Although the relative im-
portance of long-term external financing rose substantially after World
War II, the ratio remained well below the peak levels reached in
1919—1924.
The data on long-term external financing include new stock issues,
bond issues, and other types of long-term loans (see Table 44). Until
the mid-thirties, corporate long-term debt consisted almost entirely of
bond issues. Since then, however, types of long-term loans other
than bond issues have become significant components of total new
financing.20 Substantial amounts of such loans have been made to
industry by commercial banks and other lending institutions and, also,
by life insurance companies.
Unfortunately, the sample data for large manufacturing corpora-
tions do not permit the separation of the bond issues from all the other
types of long-term lending. Separate figures on long-term loans received
from commercial banks are available since 1939. The amounts and the
relative importance of these loans as a component of long-term external
financing are indicated below:
Positive Business Cycle Averages
(dollars in millions)
Total Long-Term Increase in Long- (Col. 2) as per Cent
Financinga Term Bank Loansb of (Col. 1)
Period (1) (2) (3)
1938—1946 $ 81 $59 73
1946—1949 1,012 123 12
1949_1954C 947 36 4
aAveragesfrom Table 44, column 7.
bSourcessame as in Table 44.
CUnderlyingdata cover 1949—1953.
Bank long-term lending was only moderately important as a source
of new funds for large manufacturing corporations in the war and
postwar cycles. The percentage figure shown above for 1938—1946 is
20Seethe section on term-lending in Chapter VII.
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misleading, because all long-term external financing was then' only
2.6 per cent of total new financing (external plus internal). In the
1946—1949 and 1949—1954 cycles, long-term financing in the form of
new security issues greatly expanded. In contrast, long-term bank lend-
ing increased only moderately.
Data on the sources and uses of funds for all manufacturing corpora-
Lions are available only for 1946—1953 (Table 45). The behavior of the
TABLE 45

















$8.7 $6.1 $2.6 $3.4









PER CENT OF TOTAL FINANCING
72%50% 22% 28%





a Basedon National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology.In
computing averages, values for terminal years are weighted by one-half.
b Underlying data cover 1949—1953.
Source: Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce, December 1954, p. 14.
ratios based on these data is not materially different from that of the
ratios for large corporations. In 1946—1949, gross internal financing
relative to total new financing was slightly more important for all
companies; in 1949—1953, it was a little more important for large
corporations. In 1946—1949, the ratio of short-term external financing
to total financing was considerably smaller for all corporations than it
was for large firms; but in 1949—1954, the ratios for all corporations
were higher. Finally, the ratio of long-term external financing to total
financing was slightly higher for all corporations than for large ones
in both the 1946—1949 and 1949—1954 cycles.
Net Balance of External Financing
The net balance of external financing is the inflow of external funds
adjusted for changes in financial assets. The data on large manu-
facturing corporations indicate a net release, rather than absorption,
of external funds in four out of nine positive cycles and in five out of
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CHART7
Ratios of Gross Internal Financing to Capital Expenditures on Physical
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Source: Tables 46 and 47.
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TABLE 46
Capital Expenditures on Physical Assets, Gross Internal Financing, and Net Balance
of External Financing, Large Manufacturing Corporations, 1913—1953
(dollar amounts are annual averages in millions)
Ratio of Net Balance of
Capital Expendi- (Col. 2) to External Financing
lures on Physical Gross internal (Col. 1) (Col. 1) minus
Assets Financing (per Cent) (Col. 2)
Period (1) (2) (3) (4)
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLESa
1914_1919b $450.6 $447.1 99.2% $3.5
1919—1921 428.5 367.8 85.8 60.7
1921_1924c 359.6 395.2 109.9 —35.6
1924—1927 520.0 644.2 123.9 —124.2
1927—1932 388.0 574.4 148.0 — 186.4
1932—1938 603.9 495.6 82.1 108.3
1938l946d 2,070.0 2,348.0 113.4 —278.0
1946—1949 5,453.0 4,145.0 76.0 1,308.0
1949_1954e 6,860.0 5,675.0 82.7 1,185.0
. INVERTED BUSINESS cycLEsa
19l3—l9l8 438.8 450.7 102.7 —11.9
1918—1920 518.1 444.7 85.8 73.4
1918—1920 518.1 444.7 85.8 73.4
l92O_l923 208.6 240.8 115.4 —32.2
1923—1926 445.5 576.0 129.3 — 130.5
1926—1929 596.0 779.2 130.7 —183.2
1929—1937 452.5 445.4 98.4 7.1
19371944h 807.5 897.5 lILI —90.0
1944—1948 4,022.0 3,171.0 78.8 851.0
1948—1953 6,345.0 5,433.0 85.6 912.0
a Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology. In com-
puting averages, values for terminal years are weighted by one-half for complete cycles.
For incomplete cycles, only values at peak or trough terminal years are weighted by
one-half.
b Underlying data cover 1915—1919. Underlying data cover 1915—1918.
Underlying data cover 1922—1924. Underlying data cover 1920—1922.
0 Underlying data cover 1939—1946,hUnderlyingdatacover1937—1 943,
Federal Reserve Board sample. NationalBureauof Economic Research
Underlying data cover 1949—1953.sample.
Source: 1915—1943, National Bureau of Economic Research samples; 1938—1953,
Federal Reserve Board sample of large manufacturing corporations.
nine inverted cycles during 1913—1953 (Chart 17 and Table 46).' In
the World War I cycle, the amount of gross internal financing was
close to that of physical asset expenditures (the sum of plant and
equipment expenditures and inventory changes), and the net balance
21 The sample data for 1900—1910 are incomplete and do not permit computation
of the net balance of external financing.
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of external financing was relatively insignificant. In the first postwar
cycle—I 919—1921 (trough-to-trough) or 1918—1920 (peak-to-peak)----—the
net inflow of external funds was considerable, but a substantial net
outflow was characteristic of the cycles following in the twenties. The
balance was positive in the 1932—1938 cycles, negative in the World
War II cycle, and positive again (substantially so) in the two postwar
cycles. Over the entire period, the ratio of gross internal financing to
physical asset expenditures shows a slight downward trend, while the
ratio of net external financing to such expenditures shows an upward
tendency.
The net balance of short-term external financing for large manu-
facturing corporations was negative in most cycles from 1913 through
1946. In 1946—1949 and 1949—1953, however, substantial positive
balances were registered, mainly as a result of large tax accruals. The
net balance of long-term external financing was positive in the World
War I cycle and the two immediate postwar cycles. But the remaining
part of the interwar period was characterized by a net outflow of long-
term external funds. The negative balance was especially large in the
1926—1929 cycle when large corporations made substantial investments
in securities of other companies. In the second war, we find a small net
inflow of long-term external funds. Much larger positive balances are
found in the two postwar cycles.
From the balance sheet and profit and loss data published in
Statistics of Income since 1923, together with the available estimates
of plant and equipment expenditures, we derived the net balance of
external financing for all manufacturing and mining corporations
combined. In making the derivations, we followed, the method de-
velóped by Terborgh22 which may be summarized as follows:
1. Net inflow of all (short- and long-term) external funds is obtained
by subtracting the amount of gross internal financing from the amount
of expenditures on new physical assets (plant and equipment outlays
plus inventory changes). A negative balance shows a net outflow of
external funds.23
0
Thenet inflow (or outflow) thus obtained is equivalent, in terms of
balance sheet items, to the algebraic sum of all changes in current lia-
bilities, noncurrent debt, and capital stock (adjusted for book transfers,
such as stock dividends) lessthe, algebraic sum of all changes in
nonphysical, or financial, assets (cash, accounts and notes receivable,
and government and corporate security holdings).
22 Terborgh, op. cit., p. 45.
23 In his own derivations, Terborgh includes changes in cash with capital ex-
penditures. He indicates, however, that one may wish to consider cash (mainly bank
deposits) as, a form of credit extended by corporations to banks. The latter approach
seems preferable to us and is used in this study.
0
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TABLE 47
Capital Expenditures on Physical Assets, Gross Internal Financing, and Net Balance
of External Financing, All Manufacturing and Mining Corporation, 1923—1953
(dollar amounts are annual averages in millions)
Ratio of Net Balance of
Capital Expendi- (Col. 2) to External Financing
tures on Physical Gross Internal (Col. r) (Col. 1) minus
Assets Financing (per cent) (Cal. 2)
Period (1) (2) (3) (4)
1924—1927 $2,607
POSITIVE BUSINESS CYCLES5
$ 2,692 103.3% $ —85
1927—1932 2,190 1,806 82.5 384
1932—1938 1,985 960 48.4 1,025
1938—1946 3,626 4,008 110.5 —382
1946—1949 9,209 7,273 79.0 1,936
l949_1954b 12,607 9,665 76.7 2,942
INVERTED BUSINESS CyCLESa
1923—1926 2,554 2,559 100.2 —5
1926—1929 3,067 2,915 95.0 152
1929—1937 1,724 883 51.2 841
1937—1944 3,365 3,597 106.9 + 232
1944—1948 6,907 5,258 76.1 1,649
1948_I953c 11,631 9,657 83.0 1,974
SELECTED PERIODS
1923—1929 2,975 2,806 94.3 169
1936—1940 2,996 2,120 70.8 876
1946—1952 10,941 8,175 74.7 2,766
a Based on National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle chronology. In com-
puting averages, values for terminal years are weighted by one-half for complete cycles.
For incomplete cycles, only values at peak or trough terminal years are weighted by one-
half.
b Underlying data cover 1949—1952.
Underlying data cover 1948—1952.
Column Source
I Plant and equipment expenditures (from Appendix Table C-3) reduced to
balance sheet levels plus inventory valuation adjustment (from National
Income Supplement, 1954, Survey of Current Business, Department of. Commerce,
Table 23 for 1935—1952, and extrapolated by data from George Terborgh's
worksheets for 1923—1934) plus change in inventories of balance sheet corpora-
tions (from Statistics of Income for 1935—1952 and extrapolated by data from
Terborgh's worksheets for 1923—1934).
2 Net retained profits for balance sheet corporations (from Statistics of Income for
1935—1952 and extrapolated by data from Terborgh's worksheets for 1923—
1934) plus inventory valuation adjustment (described above) less net capital
gains for all corporations (from Statistics of Income for 1935—1952 and extra-
polated by data from Terborgh's worksheets for 1923—1934) plus unadjusted
depreciation, depletion, and amortization for corporations with balance sheets
(from Statistics of Income for 1935—1952 and extrapolated by data from Ter-
borgh's worksheets for 1923—1934).
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2. The total inflow of external funds is then broken down into
short-term and long-term components. In our derivations, the net
balance of short-term financing equals the sum of changes in current
liabilities less the sum of changes in cash, marketable securities, and
accounts receivable. The net balance of long-term financing equals the
sum of changes in long-term debt and capital stock (adjusted) less the
sum of changes in long-term investments in financial assets. Since
long-term debt includes loans that do not involve security issues
(mortgage loans made by a single creditor, and term loans by banks),
the net balance of long-term financing obtained by this method is
not equivalent to the net balance of corporate security transactions
alone.
Since the available data for all companies combined are far from
exact, they must be interpreted broadly. In most cycles, 1923—1953, the
ratio of gross internal financing to capital expenditures on physical
assets (plant and equipment expenditures plus inventory changes) for
all manufacturing and mining companies was lower than the ratio for
large manufacturing concerns (Chart 17 and Tables 46 and 47). How-
ever, both series exhibit generally similar intercycle fluctuations.
In 1923—1926 (or 1924—1927), the ratio for all manufacturing and
mining was close to 100 per cent, i.e., the net balance of external
financing was negligible. However, the relative importance of net ex-
ternal funds increased substantially in the following two cycles. In
1929—1937, gross internal financing amounted to only 51 per cent (net
external financing being 49 per cent) of the total amount spent on
physical assets. During the World War II cycle, external funds were,
on balance, released to other sectors. But after the war, there was again
a considerable net inflow of external financing.
Ratios computed for periods longer than a single business cycle show
that the net inflow of external funds was larger in relation to internal
financing in 1946—1952 than in 1923—1929 but smaller in 1946—1952
than in 1936—1940 (Table 47). This istrue whether net external
financing is related to net profit retentions or to gross retentions and
whether adjusted or unadjusted profit data are used.2'
The net balance of short-term external financing was negative in
all three periods. In Table 48, short-term financing of all manu-
facturing and mining corporations is broken down into two parts. One
part represents the change in income tax liability less the change in
government security holdings, i.e., the change in the net balance of
claims between the corporations and the government. As the table
24Theadjusted profit figures discussed in this section differ from the unadjusted


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FINANCING
shows, the net amount owed to the government decreased in 1923—
1929. In 1936—1940 and 1946—1952, on the other hand, the net liability
to the government rose.
The other part of short-term financing represents the net change in
the balance of short-term claims between the companies in question
and other private sectors of the economy (the change in notes and
accounts payable less the change in cash and accounts receivable). As
the table indicates, the net liability to private short-term creditors
declined throughout 1923—1952.
In contrast, the net balance of long-term external financing was
positive during all three periods. New funds obtained through security
issues and long-term loans exceeded the funds invested in corporate
securities and long-term advances to other business units. However, the
relative importance of long-term external financing varied widely. Its
ratio to gross internal financing was highest in 1936—1940. The ratio
for 1946—1952, while considerably lower than that for 1936—1940, was
much higher than the ratio for 1923—1929. Its ratio to retained net
profit was also exceedingly high in 1936—1940. The unadjusted ratio
for 1946—1952 is slightly lower than the ratio for 1923—1929; but when
the adjusted profit data are used, the 1946—1952 ratio exceeds the one
obtained for l923_1929.25
In general, then, our data do not indicate any clear trend in the
relative importance of the net external and the internal components of
total new financing. Net external funds were relatively less important
in the postwar period than they had been in the late thirties. On the
other hand, net external funds were of greater relative importance in
the postwar years than they had been in the twenties.
Since there are no data on inventory changes prior to 1923, we could
not compare gross internal financing with total capital expenditures
and thus determine the net inflow of external funds in the earlier
periods. However, the ratio of gross internal financing to plant and
equipment expenditures (Table 40) was somewhat lower in 1946—1953
than in 1923—1929, but much higher in 1946—1953 than in 1900—1914.
Probably, the ratio of gross internal financing to total capital ex-
penditures on physical assets was also higher (and the relative im-
portance of net external financing correspondingly lower) in 1946—1953
than in 1900_l9l4.26
25 The ratio to internal financing of new security issues less retirements was sub-
stantially higher in 1923—1929 than in 1946—1952 (see Table 40 and Chart 11).
However, the inflow of funds from the security markets was largely offset by the
pronounced expansion of financial assets in the twenties. This is why the net
balance of long-term external financing was relatively low in 1923—1929.
Sample data for large manufacturing corporations indicate substantial increases
ininventories in 1900—1910.
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Summary of Findings
1. In manufacturing and mining, internal funds represented a much
greater proportion of total new financing than did external funds. Net
profit retained by all corporations in these industries was roughly twice
as large as their new security issues, net of retirements, during 1900—
1953. Their gross internal financing (the sum of retained profit and
depreciation and depletion allowances) was more than five times as
large as their new security issues. Sample data for large manufacturing
corporations indicate that gross internal funds represented around
70 per cent and total external funds (both long- and short-term) only
around 30 per cent of total new financing during the same period.
2. The relative importance of internal and external funds varied
considerably from one part of the period to another. The relative share
of internal financing tended to be smaller, and the relative share of
external financing correspondingly greater, in periods of rapid asset
expansion than in those of moderate asset-growth.
3. While the data do not permit the exact determination of relative
trends in internal and external financing over the entire period, some
broad tendencies emerge when the available figures are examined. The
ratio of internal funds to funds obtained through new security issues
rose considerably. However, owing to a rapid rise in short-term external
financing in the latter part of the period, the ratio of internal to total
external financing shows no upward trend. Thus, for all companies,
the approximate relative share of net profit retentions in financing the
expansion of assets was (in percentages): 1900—1909, 41; 1909—1919, 52;
1919—1929, 26; 1937—1948, 54; 1948—1953, 45. For large manufacturing
companies the comparable figures are: 1900—1910, 39; 1913—1918, 43;
1923—1929, 47; 1944—1953, 42. The ratios of gross internal financing to
total new financing of the large companies are (in percentages): 1900—
1919, 70; 1913—1918, 58; 1923—1929, 91; 1944—1953, 73.
Income tax accruals represented the fastest growing component of
short-term financing. If these accruals were treated as a kind of short-
term retention and included in internal financing, the ratio of internal
to total financing would show a moderate upward trend over the
period.
4. In most parts of the period reviewed, depreciation and depletion
allowances provided a considerably greater amount of internal funds
than did net profit retention. The ratio of depreciation and depletion
allowances to gross internal financing was (in percentages): 1900—1914,
48; 1919—1929, 73; 1936—1940, 89;1946—1953, 53. When valuation
adjustments are made,thefigures become 52,72,84, and 66,
respectively.
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Over the entire period, gross internal financing provided approxi-
mately a tenth more funds than the amount required to finance total
plant and equipment expenditures (gross of depreciation). The ratio
of gross internal financing to such expenditures, 1900—1953, shows an
upward trend.
5. External financing adjusted for changes in financial assets, so as
to obtain net inflow of capital funds from other sectors of the economy,
is considerably smaller than the gross (unadjusted) amount in most
parts of the period reviewed.
Only a rough estimate of net external financing can be made for the
years before World War I. Apparently, the net inflow of external funds
was then considerable. The data available for the interwar period
indicate that the net balance of external financing was very small in
relation to total financing during the twenties, but assumed greater
relative importance during the thirties. (In the depression years, the
net inflow of external funds resulted mainly from liquidation of
financial assets.) During World War II, the net balance of external
financing was negative: funds were released to other sectors through
large accumulations of financial assets. Finally, in the postwar period,
the net inflow is again substantial.
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